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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DEBRA LARECE ARANDA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Aggravated Burglary, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999); two counts of 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1999); and one count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(1996). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow criminal history and character 
evidence on two persons known to the State to be at the robbery in support of Appellant's 
compulsion defense. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to admit or excluded character 
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Salt Lake City v. Alires. 2000 UT 
Case No. 20000720-CA 
Priority No. 2 
App 244, Tf75 9 P.3d 769. 
II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Continue during 
trial and Motion for New Trial based upon her surprise when a key witness was not 
allowed to enter the courthouse to testify. 
Standard of Review: "[W]e review the decision to grant or deny a motion for a 
new trial only for an abuse of discretion. Any legal determinations made by the trial 
court as a basis for its denial of a new trial motion are reviewed for correctness." State v. 
Loose, 2000 UT 11, ^|8, 994 P.2d 1237 (citations omitted). The denial of a motion for a 
continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 
752 (Utah 1982). 
III. Whether the trial court's errors require reversal individually and under the 
cumulative error doctrine. 
Standard of Review: "Under the cumulative error doctrine, [an appellate court] 
will reverse only if'the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence 
. . that a fair trial was had.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (quotation 
omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant Debra Larece Aranda's motion to submit evidence of the criminal 
history and character of two persons know to the State to be at the robbery in support of 
her compulsion defense is preserved at R.280-81,360[32-33,77-78]. Aranda's motion for 
a new trial based on surprise when a key witness was not allowed into the courthouse to 
2 
testify is preserved at R.308-10,323-24,360[75-77],363. 
STATUTE. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, Due Process: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI, Rights of the Accused: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . [and] to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7, Due Process: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person . . . [and] to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 405(b) (2000), Methods of Proving Character: 
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a 
trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony 
as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On 
cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of 
conduct. 
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of 
character of a person is essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, 
proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct. 
3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (1999), Compulsion Defense: 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in the proscribed 
conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent 
use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or 
threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not 
have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall be unavailable 
to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a 
situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Aranda was charged by information with one count of aggravated burglary, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999); two counts of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1999); two counts of aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999); and two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, one a third degree felony and one a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999). R.17-19. An arrest warrant was issued. R.l-2. 
Aranda's case went to trial. R.211-12,280-81. She moved for a directed verdict 
based on insufficient evidence at the close of the State's case in chief. R.281;360[28]. 
The trial court denied the motion. Id. 
Aranda attempted to introduce evidence concerning the criminal history and 
character of two suspects involved in the robbery and known to the State under Utah Rule 
of Evidence 405(b) during her cross examination of Detective Nudd and direct 
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examination of William Jay Eaton ("Eaton") in support of her compulsion defense. 
R.281,360[28,32-33]. The State asserted that the evidence was inadmissible under Utah 
Rules of Evidence 608, 609 and 404(a) and -(b). R.360[26]. The trial court sustained the 
State's objection to the evidence reasoning that it was hearsay. R.360[26,32-34]. Aranda 
reasserted at the close of trial that the evidence should come in because it supported her 
defense. R.360[77-78]. The trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible, stating, 
"my review of the rules led me to the conclusion that to allow testimony regarding the 
prior bad acts or criminal history of two persons who were not going to testify in the trial, 
who were not witnesses, would simply tend to confuse the jury, would sidetrack the 
issues of the case and would, quite frankly, be in large part irrelevant." R.360[78]. 
Midtrial, Aranda learned that one of her witnesses, Terry Pierce ("Pierce"), who 
appeared at the courthouse to testify, was not allowed inside by the bailiffs because he 
was inebriated. R.360[75-76]. Aranda moved for a two-hour continuance in order to 
locate Pierce. R.326. The trial court denied the motion, stating, "I did allow you some 
time to go down and see if you couldn't locate him after the word from the bailiffs was 
received. But I did deny your request to continue the trial until such time as this witness 
had sobered up and you could have him return." R.360[77]. Aranda made a related 
motion for a new trial, arguing that the denial of the continuance prejudiced the trial 
outcome. R.308-10,363. The trial court denied that motion as well. R.325-26. 
Aranda was convicted as charged of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated 
robbery, and two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. R.281. She 
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was acquitted of the two counts of aggravated kidnaping. R.281. Aranda appeals from 
her convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 22, 1999, Aranda and two men, Greg Myers ("Myers") and John Hender 
("Hender"), went to the apartment of Honorio Garcia ("Garcia'') and Norma Rosales 
("Rosales"). R.360[37]. Aranda testified that Garcia was a drug dealer. R.360[37-38]. 
She met him through William Jay Eaton ("Eaton"), and acted as a go-between in drug 
deals between Garcia and Hender. R.3 60 [3 8]. Aranda was planning on moving to 
Kansas with her fiance, Terry Pierce ("Pierce"), and so decided to introduce Hender to 
Garcia so that they could do business directly in the future. Id. Aranda called Garcia the 
night before to ask if she could bring Hender to the apartment; Garcia agreed. R.360[29]. 
Hence, Hender and Myers accompanied Aranda to Garcia's apartment. R.360[39-40]. 
Aranda knocked on Garcia's door. R.360[41]. Garcia answered and she and 
Myers entered. Id. Hender remained in the car. Id. Soon, Hender came in and began 
talking with Garcia. Id. Hender asked to see Garcia's scale, and became agitated when 
Garcia claimed it did not work because of dead batteries. Id Hender became agitated 
and pushed Garcia, demanding that he find new batteries. R.360[42]. Garcia told 
Hender he would not do business with him. Id. Hender responded that he would do 
business with him, pulled a knife, and grabbed Garcia by the shoulder. Id Aranda 
testified that Hender grabbed the knife from a nearby dishdrainer in the kitchen where 
they conversed. Id 
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Aranda asked Hender what he was doing. R.360[43]. Hender ordered her to find 
any drug money, stereo equipment, and other valuables in the apartment. Id. Aranda 
considered running away at that point. R.3 60[43]. However, she opted to stay because 
she was scared of Hender, knew that he was capable of hurting Garcia, Rosales and their 
children, and felt guilty for bringing him to their apartment. R.360[43,60]. Although she 
did not hear Hender threaten Garcia or Rosales directly, she knew he was capable of 
violence. R.360[43]. She described Hender as aggressive and Myers as untrustworthy. 
Hence, Aranda complied, looking in a hallway closet and then in a bedroom where 
Rosales and her children were sleeping. R.360[43]. She saw Rosales and told her that 
there was a man in the living room who wanted money. R.360[44]. Rosales, who does 
not speak English, did not understand Aranda, so Aranda repeated that a man wanted 
money. Id. Rosales still did not understand, so she told Aranda to go ask Garcia. Id. 
Aranda was nervous about going back to Hender empty-handed, so she took some jewelry 
that was in a box in the bedroom and put it in her purse. Id. She hoped that the jewelry 
would coax Hender to leave the apartment. R.360[65]. Aranda returned to the living 
room and said, "come on, come on , . . . let's go, get out." R.360[44]. She walked out of 
the door and Hender followed. Id. 
Garcia and Rosales testified to a different set of facts. Testifying through an 
interpreter, they stated that Garcia heard a knock on his door at 8 a.m., a time when he 
usually does not have visitors. R.359[56,101]. Garcia answered the door. R.359[56]. 
Aranda and another man that he did not recognize were there. R.359[56-57]. They 
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asked for someone in English, but Garcia did not understand because he speaks Spanish. 
R.359[58]. Aranda and the man asked for drugs, then the man went in asking if he could 
use the bathroom. R.359[59-60]. Aranda came in too and closed the door. R.359[60]. 
She pulled a baggy from her purse that resembled drugs. Id. 
The man came out of the bathroom with a knife. R.359[60]. He held it to Garcia's 
neck and told him not to move. R.359[60]. He ordered Garcia to sit on the couch and 
said that he would kill him if he screamed. Id. A second man entered the apartment who 
Garcia did not recognize. R.359[61]. He grabbed a knife from the kitchen and held it on 
Garcia. R.359[64]. 
Aranda went into the bedroom where Rosales and the children slept. 
R.359[61,102]. Aranda asked for, "money, money," at first in a soft voice and then more 
emphatically. R.359[103,133-34]. Aranda came out of the bedroom with Rosales. 
R.359[66]. Rosales went into the living room to ask Garcia what Aranda wanted. 
R.359[104]. She saw Garcia on the couch and two men pointing knives at him. 
R.359[104]. Aranda told Rosales to sit on the couch. R.359[64]. Garcia translated for 
Rosales and told her to sit down. R.359[104]. 
The men asked Aranda for some duct tape which she pulled from her backpack. 
R.359[63,106]. Aranda handed it to them, then began searching the apartment for 
valuables while one of the men tied up Garcia and Rosales. R.359[64-65,67,106-08], 
Garcia testified that he does not use gray duct tape in his work as a mechanic. R.359[92]. 
Rosales also testified that they do not keep duct tape at their house, but admitted that she 
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did not know what kind of tape Garcia used in his business. R.359[136-37]. She 
testified at Aranda's preliminary hearing, however, that Garcia used gray duct tape at his 
work although they did not keep it at the apartment. R.359[138]. 
Garcia and Rosales heard Aranda rummaging through the drawers in the bedroom 
and kitchen. R.359[68,108-09]. The men yelled at her to hurry up, calling her "Debbie." 
R.359[69-70,109]. He heard the men ask her for a phone number. R.359[70]. He 
memorized when she called it out to them. R.359[70]. Aranda went outside. R.359[72]. 
The men cut the phone cords, and took $2400 plus some gold jewelry. R.359[72,122]. 
Garcia claimed that $1500 was his from a family money pool. R.359[71]. Rosales also 
testified that the $1500 came from a family pool, although she testified at the preliminary 
hearing that it did not. R.359[141-42]. The remaining $900 and the jewelry was from 
Rosales1 jewelry business. R.359[71,l 15,118]. The men also took Garcia's car keys. 
R.359[71,l 13], Garcia and Rosales observed as the men made a failed attempt to get into 
their truck. R.359[72,122]. 
When Aranda and the men left, Garcia untied himself and Rosales and called the 
police. R.356[74-75,123]. Aranda and the men were gone by the time the police 
responded. R.359[75]. Garcia gave the phone number that he memorized to the police. 
R.359[76]. 
Rosales testified at her trial that she did not know that Hender and Myers planned 
to rob Garcia and Rosales. R.360[57]. She was surprised when she saw them with 
knives. R.360[58-59]. She did not notice that Hender and Myers had tied up Rosales and 
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Garcia with duct tape because she was too ashamed to look at them and wanted to get out 
of the apartment as quick as possible. R.360[45,61-62,66]. She initially testified that she 
did not bring the duct tape. R.360[58]. Then she stated that she may have had the tape in 
her purse because she had been packing in preparation for her move. R.360[64]. 
Aranda testified that she started walking away after the robbery. R.360[46]. 
Hender and Myers, who were driving Hender's car, forced her to come with them. 
R.360[46]. Aranda was scared so she complied. IdL They went to the Capitol Motel 
where one of the men rented a room. Id. Aranda yelled at them for involving her in the 
robbery. R.360[47]. She dumped the jewelry out of her purse and left. Id. 
Meanwhile, Officers Kevin Nudd ("Nudd") and Paula Lozano ("Lozano"), 
assigned to investigate the crime, traced the telephone number that Garcia memorized to a 
house where Aranda was staying. R.359[145,152-53]. Garcia accompanied Nudd and 
Lozano to the house. R.359[153-54]. Aranda was not there when they arrived, but Dick 
Hicks, Aranda's housemate, informed Nudd that she had been living there for some time. 
R.359[155]. 
Aranda drove up shortly thereafter in a beige car. R.359[156]. Garcia identified 
her as one of the suspects. R.359[157]. Aranda gave Nudd her name. Id He testified 
that she appeared jittery, nervous and evasive. R.359[156]. He asked about the car and 
requested her identification. R.359[157]. She became belligerent and started calling out 
to people inside her house. Id She told Nudd that she bought the car that morning, 
producing a receipt for $750. R.359[158]. There were groceries in the trunk, which she 
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bought that morning as well. R.359[159]. 
Nudd arrested Aranda. R.359[157]. She was searched incident to arrest by 
Lozano. R.360[13]. Lozano found a pair of scissors in Aranda's back pant pocket, plus 
money and three rings in her front pocket. Id. Aranda said the rings belonged to her 
children. R.360[15]. Lozano asked what her child's name was, and Aranda responded, 
"Jacob." Id. Lozano noted that one of the rings bore an "H." Id. Aranda said her son's 
name was "Hajacob." Id. Lozano also searched Aranda's purse, in which she found a 
baggy of cocaine, a baggy of marijuana, a ring and a watch. R.360[15-16]. Lozano 
showed the jewelry to Garcia and Rosales, who identified it as their own. R.360[16]. 
Aranda was searched once more at the police station. R.360[17-18]. An 
additional $620 was found in her pocket. R.360[18]. She told Lozano that the money 
was previously hidden in her pants. Id. Lozano informed her that she was facing robbery 
charges and that the money would be booked into evidence. R.360[ 18,22]. Aranda 
replied, "I'm being accused of.. .robbing a drug dealer, how ironic." R.360[22]. 
Aranda followed up by telling Lozano that the police must not "want the jewelry bad 
enough because she could take [them] to where it was." R.360[20]. 
Aranda testified that the money found on her person was from the sale of her 
fiance's truck and was intended to be their moving money. R.360[48,72-73]. Although 
Lozano understood Aranda to say it was her "tax money," R.360[14], Aranda actually 
described it as her "truck money." R.360[72]. She explained that she lied to Lozano 
about the rings because she was scared. R.360[55]. She also admitted that she has a drug 
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habit that she is trying to overcome, she had drugs on her at the time of arrest that she 
planned to use on her road trip, and has been convicted for crimes of dishonesty, namely 
drug-related forgeries. R.360[49,54-55,57]. 
Aranda also explained that she bought the new car that morning because she 
wanted transportation to get out of town quickly since she was afraid of Hender, Myers 
and Garcia. R.360[70]. She used her trip money to buy the car rather than get her own 
car out of impound, even though that would have been cheaper, because she did not want 
to wait for the weekend to pass and risk getting hurt. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial abused its discretion in excluding testimony under Utah Rule of Evidence 
405(b) (2001) that went to Hender and Myers violent activity and character. The 
evidence established Aranda's compulsion defense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 
(1999). In excluding the evidence, the trial court violated Aranda's constitutional right to 
present a vigorous defense. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV (due process); Utah Const, art. 
I, § 7 (same). In addition, the jury was prevented from hearing pertinent information 
going to Aranda's defense and, ultimately, the guilt or innocence question. Hence, 
Aranda was denied her right to trial by an impartial jury. JSee U.S. Const, amend. IV 
(right to impartial jury); Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (same). 
The trial court likewise abused its discretion when it denied a continuance or a 
new trial for the purpose of locating an absent witness, Terry Pierce. Pierce's testimony 
was material and admissible; he could have been located and made available to testify 
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within a reasonable time; and Aranda exercised due diligence in otherwise making him 
available to testify. See State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982); State v. 
Schreuden 712 P.2d 264, 274-75 (Utah 1985). In denying the continuance or new trial, 
the trial court violated Aranda!s constitutional right to present witnesses in her favor and 
make her defense. See U.S. Const, amends. VI & XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7 & 12. 
The trial court's errors merit reversal individually and cumulatively. See State v. 
Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991) (reviewing denial of continuance for 
harmless error); Schreuden 712 P.2d at 274-75 (denial of new trial must prejudice 
defendant); State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989) (reviewing erroneous 
admission of character evidence for harmless error); Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229 (cumulative 
error merits reversal if errors undermine confidence in trial outcome). Not only did they 
materially prejudice Aranda in her ability to present a key witness and establish her 
compulsion defense, but there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome absent the 
errors. See State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987). Consequently, the outcome 
of Aranda's trial is undermined, meriting reversal in this case. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1229. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE 
RELEVANT TO ARANDA'S COMPULSION DEFENSE. 
A "defendant's right to present all competent evidence in h[er] defense is a right 
guaranteed by the due process clause of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7, as well as 
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our Federal Constitution, 14th Amendment." State v. Harding. 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 
1981). 
In the present case, Aranda sought to admit evidence of the violent and criminal 
character of the two other suspects involved in the robbery and burglary, Hender and 
Myers, to establish her compulsion defense. In order to show compulsion, Aranda had to 
submit evidence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (1999), Utah's compulsion 
defense statute, which states: 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when [s]he engaged in the 
proscribed conduct because [s]he was coerced to do so by the use or 
threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon [her] or a third 
person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in 
h[er] situation would not have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion . . . shall be unavailable to a person who 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places [her]self in a situation in 
which it is probable that [s]he will be subjected to duress. 
Id.; see also R.257 (Jury Instruction 35A - Compulsion Defense). 
In order to establish the elements of a compulsion defense, specific instances of 
misconduct are admissible and relevant pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 405(b) (2000), 
which states: 
In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is [an] 
essential element of a charge, claim or defense, proof may also be made of 
specific instances of that person's conduct. 
Citing Rule 405(b), R.360[28], Aranda made her first effort to elicit testimony in 
support of her compulsion defense during her cross-examination of State's witness Officer 
Nudd in the following colloquy: 
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Defense Counsel (to Officer Nudd): Now, this Greg Myers and John 
Hender was given to you as a name actually by us as a person who was 
there. Right? 
Nudd: That's correct. 
Defense Counsel: Now, this Myers and Hender have numerous robberies? 
State: Judge, I am going to object at this time. And may we approach? . . . . 
(Side-bar conference) 
Judge Frederick: Sometimes, members of the jury, we have to discuss 
matters at the bench which you're not to consider. They are irrelevant to 
your consideration. 
R.359[168-69]. 
Aranda's second effort to elicit testimony establishing her compulsion defense 
came during her direct examination of William Jay Eaton during the following colloquy: 
Eaton: I met Greg [Myers] through a friend of mine. And he introduced me 
to John [Hender.] And they both come [sic] over to my house at one time 
and I introduced [them] to Debbie when they came over. 
Defense Counsel: How did that introduction take place? 
Eaton: They showed up at the door and I answered the door. Greg was with 
John, and Greg told me he had a friend with him, and I invited them in. 
And we were in the front room and I introduced Debbie to Greg, and Greg 
introduced me and Debbie to John. . . . 
Defense Counsel: What did you know at the time about this John? 
State: Judge, I'd object at this time as to relevancy. 
Judge Frederick: Objection to irrelevant is sustained, what this witness 
knew about John. 
Defense Counsel: Okay. Well let me ask a more specific question then. 
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Was there anything about John or Greg that you told Debra about? 
State: Objection again, Judge. Relevancy and hearsay. 
Judge Frederick: Sustained. 
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, that goes directly to my defense, what she 
knew about John and Greg. 
Judge Frederick: What she knew about parties X, Y and Z is something in 
her mind. But what you are asking this witness to do is give a statement 
made out of court about the truth of what was represented. 
Defense Counsel: It's his statement. 
Judge Frederick: It's hearsay to the State, counsel. Objection is sustained 
on both grounds. 
Defense Counsel: Okay. . . . Now, did Debra, okay, give you any indication 
of what she thought of, whether she was afraid of John? 
Eaton: She didn't like John at all, or Greg. 
State: I'd object again. This is basically a back door to hearsay as far as 
what was told to this to this defendant or told to this witness by the 
defendant. 
Judge Frederick: It is. 
Defense Counsel: It's my client's statement. 
Judge Frederick: Your client has made a lot of statements that are not 
admissible in court. That particular conversation that you're referring to 
and asking this man to relate to us is hearsay to the State's case, and 
therefore the objection is sustained. 
Defense Counsel: How is a party's statement made by my client hearsay to 
the State? 
Judge Frederick: I have ruled. . . . You may not agree with me but I have 
ruled. Let's move on. . . . 
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Defense Counsel: I suppose that you were around John and Greg and 
around Debra on other occasions. 
Eaton: Yes, I was. All of my friends that came to the house Debbie pretty 
much knew. 
Defense Counsel: Did you observe how Debbie reacted when these people, 
when John and Greg were around? 
Eaton: There was a lot of friction between me and Debbie concerning a lot 
of my friends. Greg was never one of my better friends. And the 
association that I had with Greg and John, she didn't like that at all. She 
was uncomfortable with it, more or less nervous most of the time. So it 
caused a lot of friction between me and her. 
Defense Counsel: What was she nervous about? 
State: Objection, speculation. 
Judge Frederick: Sustained. 
Defense Counsel: Did she portray anything other than nervousness around 
these people? 
Eaton: She didn't like his appearance. She was intimidated by him. 
Defense Counsel: I have no further questions. 
R.360[31-35]. 
Judge Frederick summarized his rulings as to all of Aranda's proffered testimony 
when he stated: 
[C]ounsel for the State had objected to testimony incident to the criminal 
histories of two persons who were, number one, not identified as witnesses; 
number two, were not witnesses. And my review of the rules led me to the 
conclusion that to allow testimony regarding the prior bad acts or criminal 
history of the two persons who were not going to testify in the trial, who 
were not witnesses, would simply tend to confuse the jury, would sidetrack 
the issues of the case and would, quite frankly, be in large part irrelevant. 
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R.360[78]. The trial court's decision is clearly erroneous and compromised Aranda's right 
to present a vigorous defense. See U.S. Const, amend. V & XIV (due process); Utah 
Const, art. I, § 7 (same); United States v. McClure. 546 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding 
that exclusion of testimony concerning specific conduct of informant who threatened 
defendant, proffered to show that defendant was coerced into selling drugs, constituted 
reversible error). 
Utah law is silent as to the application of Rule 405(b) in the context of defendants 
proffering testimony to support a compulsion defense. However, Rule 405(b) is related 
to 404(b) and, therefore, case law under Rule 404(b) is instructive. See, e.g.. State v. 
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 194-95 (Utah 1988) (Durham, J., concurring) (noting relationship 
between Rule 404 and 405 as they concern character evidence and specific instances of 
conduct). One such case, McClure, 546 F.2d 670, is instructive. 
In McClure, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a lower court committed 
reversible error when it excluded evidence that a DEA informant intimidated the 
defendant into selling heroin. 546 F.2d at 672-73. Appellant asserted an entrapment 
defense which "centered around the claim that he sold heroin to [a government agent] 
because he was afraid of [the informant] and was threatened with dire consequences if he 
refused." Id at 672. The evidence that appellant proffered consisted of information that 
the informant had coerced other individuals into selling heroin, carried a gun just after the 
sales made by defendant, and had carried out a systematic campaign of threats and 
intimidation against other persons. Id. 
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In holding that the trial court committed reversible error, McClure relied on 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)1 and reasoned: 
under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) [footnote omitted] evidence of a systematic 
campaign of threats and intimidation against other persons is admissible to 
show lack of criminal intent by a defendant who claims to have been 
illegally coerced. Rule 404(b) is normally used by the government to show 
evidence of prior similar offenses committed by the defendant. In such 
cases, strict standards for admissibility protect the defendant from 
prejudice, [citation omitted.] But in the case before us it was the defendant 
who sought to introduce evidence of the informant's scheme. His right to 
present a vigorous defense required admission of the proffered testimony. 
The fact that it referred exclusively to threats made by Carroll after the 
sales by appellant affects its weight but not its admissibility, [footnote 
omitted.] 
We intimate no opinion as to the credibility of the appellant's entrapment 
defense. We decide only that a jury could not properly convict him absent 
the opportunity to hear the proffered testimony bearing upon his theory of 
defense and weigh its credibility along with the other evidence in the case. 
McClure. 546 F.2d at 673. McClure compels the like conclusion that exclusion of 
Aranda's compulsion defense evidence is reversible error. 
As required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1), Aranda had to show that she "was 
1
 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) states: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. 
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
The wording of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) (2001) is identical but for one more 
provision which states, "In other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it 
is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 
403." 
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coerced to [commit the burglary and robberies] by the use or threatened imminent use of 
unlawful physical force . . . , which force or threatened force a person of reasonable 
firmness in h[er] situation would not have resisted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1). To 
the extent that Aranda had to show that she was compelled through fear of Hender and 
Myers, specific instances of their conduct "is [an] essential element of. . . [her] 
defense." Utah R. Evid. 405(b). 
Specifically, evidence that Hender and Myers were previously convicted of 
robbery, R.359[169]; evidence of what Eaton knew about Hender and Myers when he 
introduced them to Aranda, R.360[32]; what he told Aranda about them, R.360[33]; 
whether and how Aranda indicated to Eaton what she thought of Hender and Myers, 
R.360[33]; and why Aranda was nervous about them, R.360[34], goes to the reason that 
she participated in the burglary and robberies. Such evidence showed that she was 
reasonably afraid of imminent physical force against herself or Garcia, Rosales, and their 
children, on account of their violent nature, their demonstrated history of violent crime 
against people, and her pre-existing fear of them in which compelled her to commit the 
burglary and robberies in this instance. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1); see also 
Illinois v. Husted. 422 N.E.2d 962, 968 (111. App. 1981) (exclusion of statements 
proffered to show effect of a person on defendant claiming compulsion constituted error); 
( United States v. Swanson, 9 F.3d 1354, 1359 n.10 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that evidence 
of threat issued by person who allegedly coerced defendant into manufacturing and 
distributing marijuana would be admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 405(b) if known to 
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defendant at time of offense). 
Hence, as in McClure, the excluded evidence "show[ed] lack of [culpable] intent 
by [Aranda] who claims to have been illegally coerced." 546 F.2d at 673; see also 
Swanson, 9 F.3d at 1359 n.10. Accordingly, "[her] right to present a vigorous defense 
required the admission of the proffered testimony." McClure. 546 F.2d at 673; see also 
Illinois v. Canamore, 411 N.E.2d 292 (111. App. 1980) (exclusion of conversation integral 
to defendant's theory of defense that she took car without knowledge that it was stolen 
denied defendant fair trial). 
The trial court's error is underscored by the fact that Aranda, not the State, sought 
to introduce the evidence. R.359[169];360[31-34]. Where a defendant seeks to introduce 
evidence, the rationale for strict standards excluding such testimony - to protect 
defendants from undue prejudice - is not at play. See McClure, 546 F.2d at 673. If 
anything, exclusion of the evidence impermissibly tipped the burden of proof onto 
Aranda since, in the compulsion defense context, the State bears the burden to disprove 
the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Jocic. 207 F.3d 889, 892 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (defining government's burden once defendant presents prima facie case of 
coercion). Without the proffered testimony, which constituted a significant and integral 
portion of her compulsion defense, the State was effectively relieved of its burden to 
make its case and thereby impermissibly profited from the trial court's error. See id. 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not correctly exclude the proffered 
testimony as hearsay or as confusing and irrelevant. As an initial matter, defense counsel 
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asked Eaton, "[w]as there anything about John or Greg that you told Debra about." 
R.360[32]. The court struck the testimony on the basis of hearsay. R.360[32-33]. Such 
testimony is not hearsay by definition because it was offered by the declarant. "'Hearsay' 
is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 
801(c) (2001) (emphasis added). Since Eaton made the statement that Aranda proffered, 
he was the "declarant" for purposes of Rule 801(c). See Utah R. Evid. 801(b) 
("'declarant' is a person who makes a statement"). Since he was the declarant, his 
statement is not excludable as hearsay. See Utah R. Evid. 801(b)-(c). 
In addition, statements of this nature are not properly defined as hearsay in the 
context of a coercion defense because they do not go to the "truth of the matter asserted." 
Utah R. Evid. 801(c). "A threat [or other specific conduct] offered to . . . prove 
propensity is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and, therefore, is not 
hearsay." Swanson, 9 F.3d at 1358 n.7 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); United States v. 
Wright. 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). A "threat [or other specific conduct] 
would constitute hearsay only if. . .offered . . . to prove the truth of the words [or 
conduct] asserted." Id; see also Canamore, 411 N.E.2d 292, 294 (statements made by 
third person were not hearsay and were admissible "to demonstrate the effect of the 
statements upon [defendant] and her companion. In this manner, she could advance her 
reason for being unaware the automobile was stolen and buttress the good faith of her 
beliefs"). 
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In the present case, the proffered testimony would have shown Hender and Myers1 
propensity for violence and, hence, Aranda's fear of them for purposes of her compulsion 
defense. Eaton's statement was not offered to prove that Hender and Myers actually 
committed the specific acts. Accordingly, the trial court erroneously excluded his 
testimony as hearsay. 
The trial court similarly erred in excluding the proffered testimony as irrelevant, 
confusing and misleading. R.360[78]. Utah Rule of Evidence 402 (2001) permits a trial 
court to exclude evidence that is irrelevant, while Utah Rule of Evidence 403 (2001) 
permits it to exclude evidence, even if relevant, if it is prejudicial, confusing, misleading, 
cumulative, or would result in a delay or waste of time. As noted supra, the proffered 
testimony is relevant because it has a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable . . . than it would be 
without the evidence," to wit, that Aranda was afraid of Hender and Myers given what 
she knew of their violent past and was therefore compelled to participate in the present 
crimes. Utah R. Evid. 401 (defining "relevant evidence"); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-302 (Compulsion Defense). 
Moreover, contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the proffered evidence would 
not be confusing or misleading. R.360[78]. The court was concerned that the evidence 
of Hender and Myers' criminal history and violent character would be confusing because 
they were not witnesses in the trial. Id. Nothing in the language of Rule 405(b), 404, 
403, 402, or 401 limits the admissibility of specific conduct evidence to that pertaining to 
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trial participants alone. See generally Utah R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 404, 405. Case law 
shows that such evidence is routinely admitted under the evidentiary rules although the 
person(s) it refers to is not a witness. See, e.g., Canamore. 411 N.E.2d at 294 (holding 
that statement made by person not participating in defendant's trial was admissible to 
show that she acted in good faith when she drove a car later discovered to be stolen). 
Indeed, where, as here, the referenced persons are possible co-defendants who 
would not testify to protect their Fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination, 
admission of such testimony is necessary in order to preserve Aranda's due process right 
to present her defense and to the privileges afforded under the evidentiary rules in pursuit 
of that goal. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. In the context of a 
compulsion and other like defenses, limiting the application of the evidentiary rules to 
allow testimony only if the referenced person participates in trial would significantly 
curtail a criminal defendant's right to present her defense and ultimately subvert the 
purpose of the evidentiary rules, which is to minimize prejudice to the accused. 
Excluding the proffered testimony in Aranda's case on the basis that Hender and 
Myers were not witnesses was unwarranted for the added reason that the jury was well 
aware that they were involved in the crimes at issue. There was ample and unequivocal 
evidence at trial, presented by both the State and the defense, establishing that Hender 
and Myers were participants. Both Garcia and Rosales testified that they were there. 
R.359[54-99,100-143]. The State stipulated that Myers' fingerprint was found on the 
duct tape. R.359[168]. Moreover, Aranda identified Hender and Myers as the two men 
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that accompanied her to the Garcia/Rosales apartment. R.360[37]. Where the identities 
and involvement of Hender and Myers were so clearly presented to the jury, there is no 
risk of confusion. If anything, the jury was unable to perform its constitutional duty of 
determining guilt or innocence when Judge Frederick deprived it of information necessary 
to assess Aranda's compulsion defense. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 (right to fair and 
impartial jury); U.S. Const, amend. VI (same). Consequently, Aranda was denied a trial 
by a fair and impartial jury. Id, 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding 
testimony under Utah Rule of Evidence 405(b) that went to Hender and Myers violent 
activity and character. The evidence established Aranda's compulsion defense. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-302. In excluding the evidence, the trial court violated Aranda's 
constitutional right to present a vigorous defense. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV (due 
process); Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (same); McClure, 546 F.2d at 673. In addition, the jury 
was prevented from hearing pertinent information going to Aranda's defense and, 
ultimately, the guilt or innocence question. Hence, Aranda was denied her right to trial 
by an impartial jury. See U.S. Const, amend. IV (right to impartial jury); Utah Const, art. 
I, § 12 (same). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ARANDA A 
CONTINUANCE OR A NEW TRIAL AFTER A KEY WITNESS WAS 
BARRED FROM ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE. 
In the present case, one of Aranda's key witnesses, Terry Pierce, was barred from 
entering the courthouse when he showed up to testify at her trial. R.325-26. According 
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to the bailiffs, he was inebriated and barely able to walk. Id. After he was turned away 
from the courthouse, Pierce went to his workplace at Labor Ready, then he went home. 
R.363[4]. 
Aranda had subpoenaed Pierce and expected him to appear at trial to testify in her 
defense. R.l 19 (subpoena). When she learned that Pierce had been turned away from 
the courthouse, the trial court granted her a "brief recess" to locate him. R.360[77]. 
Unable to do so in the brief time allowed, she moved for a two-hour continuance in order 
to find him. R.325-26. She had a home phone number for Pierce and was, therefore, 
able to reach him if allowed to do so. R.363[5]. The trial court denied her motion. 
R.360[77]. She made a related motion for a new trial, arguing that she was prejudiced by 
the denial of the continuance. R.308-10 (written motion), 363 (oral motion). The trial 
court denied the motion for a new trial. R.325-26. 
With regard to absent witnesses and a related request for a new trial, the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated: 
The sixth amendment to the federal constitution guarantees that ff[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . .to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . ." In 
Washington v. Texas. 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967), 
the United States Supreme Court found a violation of this guarantee where 
the defendant had been arbitrarily deprived of "testimony [that] would have 
been relevant and material, and . . .vital to the defense." Id. at 16 [] 
(emphasis added). In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal 458 U.S. 858, 
102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982), the Supreme Court reasoned that 
the language of the sixth amendment and of Washington suggested that a 
criminal defendant, in order to establish a violation of his constitutional 
right to compulsory process, must make some plausible showing that the 
testimony of the absent witness "would have been both material and 
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favorable to his defense." IcL at 873 [] (footnote omitted). Testimony is 
material, and its exclusion is therefore prejudicial, if there is a reasonable 
probability that its presence would affect the outcome of the trial. "A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome." Strickland v. Washington. 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674(1984). 
"The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern 
with the justice of the finding of gui l t . . . . This means that the omission 
must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no 
reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the evidence is considered, 
there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is 
already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor 
importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt." 
Valenzuela-Bernal 458 U.S. at 868 [] (citing United States v. Agurs. 427 
U.S. 97, 112-13, 96 S.Ct. 2392, [] 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). 
State v. Schreuden 712 P.2d 264, 274-75 (Utah 1985); see also Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
(guaranteeing criminal defendants right to "have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf); U.S. Const, amend. XIV (due process); Utah 
Const, art. I, § 7 (same); Utah R. Crim. P. 24 (2001) ("court may, upon motion of a party 
or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party"). 
The same constitutional concerns and a similar standard govern the propriety of a 
continuance. See Hawaii v. Valmoja, 540 P.2d 63, 64 (Hawaii 1975) (holding that trial 
court violated defendant's due process rights when it denied continuance that would allow 
him to procure absent witness where witness1 testimony was relevant and material and 
absence was not attributable to a lack of due diligence). "When a defendant in a criminal 
action moves for a continuance in order to procure the testimony of an absent witness, 
such a defendant must show that the testimony sought is material and admissible, that the 
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witness could actually be produced, that the witness could be produced within a 
reasonable time, and that due diligence has been exercised before the request for a 
continuance." State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). 
In the present case, the trial court denied the continuance, stating: 
I did allow you some time to go down and see if you couldn't locate him 
after the word from the bailiffs was received. But I did deny your request 
to continue the trial until such time as this witness had sobered up and you 
could have him return. 
R.360[77]. 
The trial court similarly denied Aranda's related motion for a new trial based on 
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This Court adopts the stipulated proffer of facts submitted by counsel as 
the factual record as to what Terry Pierce and Deputy Sisneros would have 
testified to for Defendant's New Trial Motion. 
2. During trial, as part of the defense case, Defendant expected to call as a 
witness for the defense, Terry Pierce. 
3. Mr. Pierce came to court, as asked by the defense, on the morning of 
trial on February 10, 2000. Mr. Pierce was stopped by court security staff 
based upon what Deputy Sisneros said was a strong smell of alcohol and 
Mr. Pierce being in an obviously intoxicated state. Mr. Pierce was 
intoxicated to the point that he was barely able to walk. Mr. Pierce was 
ultimately told to leave the courthouse or he would be ticketed. Court 
Bailiffs then notified the State and Defense counsel of what had happened. 
4. Defense counsel took a short recess to find out what happened and then 
requested a two hour continuance to attempt to locate Mr. Pierce who was 
no longer in the area of the courthouse. That request was denied and the 
trial resumed and concluded a few hours later the same day. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Mr. Pierce was intoxicated and therefore not able to enter the courthouse 
or testify. There is no way to know when Mr. Pierce would have been in a 
sober state of mind to be able to testify. 
2. Defendant has not shown that Mr. Pierce would have been ready to 
testify in a reasonable amount of time and in a sober state of mind. 
Defendant has also not shown that even if Mr. Pierce's testimony would 
have been allowed after a continuance, it would not have likely changed the 
outcome of the trial. 
Therefore, the Defendant has not shown that the denial of the 
Defendant's motion to continue the trial to locate Mr. Pierce prejudiced the 
Defendant and Defendant's Motion for a [N]ew Trial is denied. 
R.325-26. 
In light of Schreuder, Creviston, and the overarching constitutional concern that 
Aranda be afforded the right to present her defense and obtain witnesses in her favor, the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying both the continuance and the motion for a new 
trial. See Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 274-75; Creviston. 646 P.2d at 753; U.S. Const, amend. 
VI & XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7 & 12. To the extent that a motion for a new trial and a 
continuance are governed by similar standards, they shall be addressed together under the 
more specific criteria concerning denied motions for a continuance. 
As an initial matter, Aranda established that Pierce's testimony was both "material 
and admissible." Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752; see also Schreuder. 712 P.2d at 274 
(quoting Valenzuela-Bernal 458 U.S. at 873) (noting that witness' testimony must be 
"'material and favorable to [] defense'"). Aranda summarized Pierce's anticipated 
testimony at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, stating: 
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What Mr. Pierce would testify to is . . . that he knew [Ho]norio Garcia and 
Norma Rosales, that they were drug dealers[] that he frequented, that he 
and Debbie had bought drugs for about one year from them. In fact, the 
day before, the night before he bought drugs from [Ho]norio Garcia and 
was arrested on the way home from that. When he was released from jail. . 
. he knew John Hender and Greg Myers, Debbie had known Greg Myers. . . 
That Debbie and Terry Pierce had been planning to leave town. He was 
going to be working for Bonneville Construction. They sold his truck for 
about a thousand dollars, got some other cash that he had been saving, was 
going to introduce John and Greg to [Ho]norio Garcia so they could get 
drugs from [him]. He, of course, was arrested the night before and so was 
not involved in this incident that happened. 
He would testify that he knew of no plan or, and Debbie had never 
mentioned any plan to rob [Ho]norio or Norma. When he did get out of jail 
he did have a conversation where John Hender had been bragging . . . about 
how stupid Debbie had been in the situation and that she had not known 
about the situation and that she had been the one who had been arrested. 
Dick Hicks finally ran John Hender off of his property. And that would be 
the extent of [Pierce's] testimony, other than he knew that Debbie was 
intimidated by John Hender. He was sort of an imposing individual. That 
would be the extent of his testimony had he been able to testify. 
R.363[5-6]. Aranda offered a similar account of Pierce's anticipated testimony when she 
argued for a continuance.2 The State stipulated to Aranda's summary of Pierce's 
2
 Aranda made the following proffer when she requested the continuance during a 
trial recess: 
[0]ne of my witnesses, Terry Pierce, would have testified to a number of 
things that were important to our case if he had been here, including: That 
he had bought drugs from [Garcia and Rosales] and has actually been 
convicted of that charge; that he had information about how Debra reacted 
around this John and Greg; had some information about John and Greg and 
had information about what their plans were; the fact that Debra had not 
planned any drug robbery or robbery of these people. 
R.360[75-76]. 
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anticipated testimony in regard to both her request for a continuance and a new trial. 
R.360[76],363[6]; cf Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752 (trial court properly denied continuance 
where defendant did not make adequately detailed proffer; he merely stated that absent 
witness1 testimony would be "Vital"' and that she would "'testify on his behalf"). 
Pierce's testimony was, in fact, material and admissible because it corroborated 
Aranda's own testimony concerning the events and supports her compulsion defense. Slee 
Utah R. Evid. 401 ("'relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"); Utah R. Evid. 402 
(relevant evidence is generally admissible); Utah R. Evid. 403 (relevant evidence 
admissible when not prejudicial, cumulative, confusing, or cause delay); Utah R. Evid. 
405(b) (permitting evidence of specific conduct to establish element of defense). 
Specifically, Pierce's testimony would establish that Aranda was intimidated by 
Hender and Myers and, therefore, coerced into committing the burglary and robberies. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (compulsion defense); see, e.g., supra Point I (discussing 
relevance of similar evidence under Rule 405(b) to Aranda's compulsion defense). For 
instance, Pierce would testify that Hender, in particular, was so intimidating that even 
Dick Hicks, Aranda's roommate, kicked him off his property. R.363[5-6]. His testimony 
would also support the defense because it showed that Hender and Myers planned the 
crimes without Aranda's knowledge, later bragging how dumb Aranda was to fall into 
their plan. Id That Aranda was unaware of the planned crime would be underscored by 
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Pierce's testimony that she never divulged the plan to him, id; since Aranda and Pierce 
were involved in a relationship, it follows that she would share this secret if she in fact 
knew about the crime in advance. Pierce's testimony would also corroborate Aranda's 
testimony that Garcia and Rosales were drug dealers; and that Hender and Myers had 
done business with them previously. Id Consequently, Pierce's testimony would 
establish the likelihood that Hender and Myers had a robbery and burglary in mind when 
they arranged to go to the Garcia/Rosales home with Aranda since drug dealers generally 
have a lot of money on them. 
Finally, Pierce's testimony would corroborate Aranda's assertion that the money 
found on her when she was arrested came from the sale of Pierce's truck and not the 
burglary/robberies; and that she and Pierce were, in fact, planning to leave town and she 
had the money on her to cover their travel expenses. Id By extension, Pierce's testimony 
would also corroborate Aranda's testimony that the duct tape in her purse may have been 
placed there, without her knowledge, while they packed for the move. Id 
The trial court additionally abused its discretion in failing to grant a continuance or 
new trial because Pierce was available and "could [have] be[en] produced within a 
reasonable time." Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752. During the motion for a continuance, 
Aranda asked for a mere two hour break in the trial in which to locate Pierce. R.326. 
She had Pierce's "home telephone number, and had a way to contact him." R.363[5]. 
In fact, it was likely that he could have been contacted within that time. As 
Aranda explained at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, Pierce "left [the courthouse 
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in the morning], he went back to work briefly at Labor Ready, and then went home." 
R.363[4]. The record does not specify, but Pierce was probably home midmorning 
considering that he left work that morning at 8:30 a.m. and came directly to the 
courthouse. Id Accordingly, Aranda could have phoned Pierce at his home and left a 
message if he was not there. Since he was at work for only a brief time, then went home, 
he likely would have received the message before the end of trial, which went on until 
almost 1:00 p.m. R.281 (minute entry noting that jury retired at 12:51 p.m.). Pierce 
could have contacted her then, and she could have arranged for him to come back and 
testify before trial ended that same afternoon. Additionally, although the record is 
unclear, Aranda likely knew where Pierce worked since he was her boyfriend. 
Consequently, she could have contacted him at Labor Ready if she was unable to reach 
him at home. Cf Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752 (trial court did not abuse discretion in 
denying continuance where absent witness would not be available to testify for months or 
years; absent witness was a codefendant who asserted Fifth amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination and, therefore, would not be available until after his own trial and 
appeal was complete). 
The trial court denied the continuance and the new trial on the assumption that 
Pierce would not be sober enough to testify even if he was located within a reasonable 
amount of time given his "propensities" to drink. R.363[l 1], This rationale is too 
speculative to serve as a legitimate basis for the trial court's denial. Although Pierce had 
a beer the morning of trial and was drunk when he appeared at the courthouse, R.363[4], 
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nothing in the record suggests that he was unable to sober up in time to testify later that 
afternoon. Generally, it is not good policy for courts to preclude witness testimony on 
the premise that a person given to drink is incapable of sobering up. It is an unfortunate 
reality that many people abuse alcohol. Nonetheless, they, like Pierce, are able sober up 
enough to hold down jobs and perform any of a number of important tasks, including 
testifying competently at trial. Accordingly, the trial court should have given Pierce the 
benefit of the doubt and granted the continuance or new trial. Indeed, Aranda's 
constitutional right to present her witness and establish her defense outweighs any 
speculative risk that Pierce may have been too inebriated to testify competently. See, 
e.g.. State v. Tolano. 2001 UT App 37, J^13, 414 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (defendant's "right to 
a fair trial outweighed any inconvenience to the court, the opposing party, and the jury 
that may have been caused by a continuance" sought to obtain information on proposed 
expert witness). 
As a final matter, the denial of the continuance and new trial amounted to an abuse 
of discretion because Aranda exercised "due diligence" in securing Pierce's attendance. 
Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752. She subpoenaed Pierce on January 3, 2000. R.l 19; see 
Valmoja, 540 P.2d at 64 (trial court erred in denying continuance where defendant 
properly subpoenaed absent witness). He obviously received the subpoena to the extent 
that he appeared at the courthouse to testify on the morning of her trial. R.325. In 
addition, she promptly requested a continuance of trial when she learned of his absence. 
See State v. Gehring, 694 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1984) (new trial not required to secure 
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absent witness where defendant failed to first request continuance). 
In light of the foregoing, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied a 
continuance or a new trial for the purpose of locating Pierce. Pierce's testimony was 
material and admissible; he could have been located and made available to testify within 
a reasonable time; and Aranda exercised due diligence in otherwise making him available 
to testify. See State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982); State v. Schreuder. 712 
P.2d 264, 274-75 (Utah 1985). In denying the continuance or new trial, the trial court 
violated Aranda's constitutional right to present witnesses in her favor and make her 
defense. See U.S. Const, amends. VI & XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7 & 12. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS MERIT REVERSAL 
INDIVIDUALLY AND CUMULATIVELY. 
The trial court's errors merit reversal individually and cumulatively. See, e.g.. 
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989) (reviewing erroneous admission of 
character evidence for harmless error); see also State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 
App. 1991) (citation omitted) ("moving party must show that it was materially prejudiced 
by the court's denial of the continuance or that the trial result would have been different 
had the continuance been granted"); Shreuder, 712 P.2d at 274-75 (denial of new trial 
merits reversal if it prejudices moving party). 
Individually, the court's errors were not harmless because Aranda was materially 
prejudiced in that she was effectively prevented from presenting her compulsion defense 
and, consequently, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would 
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have been different absent the errors. See State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) 
(defining reversible error as that which materially prejudices defendant or creates "fa 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant1") (citations and 
quotations omitted). First, the errors were prejudicial because the proffered testimony 
regarding Hender and Myers' violent conduct and propensities, as well as Pierce's 
testimony concerning Aranda's fear of them, was integral to her compulsion defense. 
See, e.g.. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) (considering importance of 
testimony to defendant's case in assessing harmlessness). The only other evidence going 
to her compulsion defense consisted of her own testimony. Cf Oliver, 820 P.2d at 477 
(defendant did not show that trial outcome would be different had continuance been 
granted where defense counsel was able to explore areas that would have been covered 
by absent witness through other witnesses present at trial). A jury is more likely to 
believe a defendant whose testimony is corroborated by a third party witness, such as 
Eaton, Pierce or Detective Nudd. See supra Point I-II (discussing how evidence supports 
compulsion defense). The prejudice is amplified in this case in that Detective Nudd 
would likely sway a jury even more considering that he is a representative of the State, 
was a witness for the state, and does not have the same bias toward Aranda as her own 
witnesses may be perceived to have. 
To this extent, the Hawaii Supreme Court's opinion in Valmoja is compelling. 540 
P.2d at 64. There, a trial court's decision to deny a continuance, requested on account of 
absent witnesses, was held to be prejudicial error because it impacted the defendant's 
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ability to present his defense and violated his right for obtaining witnesses in his favor. 
14 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)); see also U.S. Const, amend. VI & 
XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7 &12. The Valmoja Court reasoned, 
the materiality of the testimony of at least one of the absent witnesses with 
respect to the defendant's alibi defense became apparent during the trial, 
[and hence] this omission was clearly prejudicial. The defendant in a 
criminal prosecution is entitled to compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor. By denying the motion for a continuance when 
defense counsel had acted diligently to procure the absent witnesses and 
their testimony was relevant and material to the defense, the district judge 
denied this right to the defendant. 
Id. (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (other citation omitted)). As in 
Valmoja, the exclusion of the evidence under Rule 405(b), as well as the denial of the 
continuance or new trial which would have allowed Aranda to present Pierce's testimony, 
is prejudicial error because it violated her constitutional right to present witnesses in her 
favor and significantly impaired her ability to present her compulsion defense. See id.; 
U.S. Const, amends. VI & XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7 & 12. 
The denial of the continuance or new trial, and the resulting inability to present 
Pierce's testimony, constitutes prejudicial error for the added reason that Pierce's 
testimony would have bolstered Aranda's own testimony. For example, Pierce would 
corroborate that the money found on her person when she was arrested was intended for 
use on her trip with Pierce and that it derived from the sale of his truck, rather than the 
proceeds from the robbery and burglary. R.360[48,72-73],363[5-6]. It would also 
corroborate her statement that she and Pierce previously arranged to leave town together 
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to go to his new job, and that she was not fleeing Salt Lake to escape authorities. 
R.360[38],363[5-6]. Moreover, by inference, Pierce's testimony that he and Aranda were 
moving would bolster her statement that the duct tape in her backpack, allegedly used to 
bind Garcia and Rosales, was in fact placed there as she packed for the move and that she 
did not realize it given that her purse was so large and she was otherwise distracted by all 
that she had to do in preparation for the move. R.360[64],363[5-6]. Standing alone, 
Aranda's statements may appear in the eyes of the jury nothing but dubious claims from a 
person trying to escape guilt. However, bolstered by Pierce, Aranda's testimony takes on 
a new significance and credibility. Hence, Pierce's testimony could likely sway the jury 
toward a verdict of "not guilty." See Knight, 734 P.2d at 919. 
The errors are individually prejudicial for the added reason that the other evidence 
against Aranda is not overwhelming or compelling. Cf. Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240 
(erroneous admission of improper character evidence harmless given substantial other 
evidence supporting the verdict). The only direct evidence against Aranda consisted of 
the testimonies of Garcia and Rosales. Although they testified that she was present 
during the burglary and robberies, their testimony is consistent with her defense of 
compulsion to the extent that very little of what they said indicates that she willingly 
participated in the crimes. For instance, they stated that she rummaged through the back 
room and took some of their valuables. R.359[68,108-09]. However, such evidence 
leaves open the question of whether she participated willingly in the crimes. In addition, 
Rosales and Garcia testified that she had their gold jewelry on her person when she was 
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arrested. R.359[78]. This evidence does not compellingly negate her compulsion 
defense either since she would have taken it, compelled to do so by Hender and Myers. 
The only element of Garcia and Rosales' testimony which might undercut Aranda's 
defense is their allegation that she pulled the duct tape from her purse, which leads to the 
inference that she was involved in the planning of the crime and was not coerced or 
surprised when it happened. R.359[63,106]. But, that testimony is consistent with 
Aranda's, which is that she did not remember bringing duct tape and that it may have been 
placed in her backpack, a large and cavernous sack where something might be placed and 
not seen, without her knowledge while she packed for a move. R.360[64]. Moreover, 
Rosales herself testified that the duct tape may have belonged her husband, who uses 
similar tape in his mechanic business. R.359[138]. 
The other evidence against Aranda was circumstantial and similarly uncompelling 
as to her guilt. For instance, the State presented that Aranda bought a car for $750 after 
the crimes, and that several hundred dollars was found on her person when she was at the 
jail. R.359[158],360[18]. The presence of a large sum of money is not compelling since 
many people carry a lot of money for varied and legitimate reasons. And, in fact, Aranda 
testified that she had the money because she and Pierce just sold his truck and were 
preparing to leave on a trip. R.360[48,72-73]. Hence, she was able to buy the car with 
legitimately procured funds and not the illicit proceeds of the burglary and robberies. 
The State also presented evidence of post-arrest statements made by Aranda. The 
first statement concerned her misrepresentation to the police that an initial "H" on a ring 
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found in her pocket stood for her son, "Hajacob." R.360[15]. This evidence does not 
unequivocally or compellingly point to guilt because it is not unusual for someone to be 
evasive around police out of nervousness. See, e.g.. State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 86 
(Utah App. 1987) (officers did not have reasonable suspicion where defendant merely 
demonstrated nervousness around officer). Indeed, Aranda had cause to be nervous, 
having just been forced into committing the burglary and robbery; fearing reprisals from 
either Garcia, Hender or Myers; and facing arrest, in the presence of at least two officers, 
for crimes that she did not willingly commit. 
The second set of statements is equally ambiguous concerning her guilt. When she 
was in the jail, Aranda stated to Officer Lozano, "I'm being accused of. . . robbing a drug 
dealer, how ironic." R.360[22]. Aranda followed up by telling Lozano that the police 
must not "want the jewelry bad enough because she could take [them] to where it was." 
R.360[20]. First, Aranda's use of the word "accused" negates any inference of guilt. 
Indeed, it was a correct assessment of her situation: she was, in fact, accused of robbery 
at the time she made the statement, and had been informed so by Lozano shortly before 
she said these words. Second, her statement regarding the whereabouts of the jewelry is 
not compelling evidence of guilt. Since she was with Hender and Myers after they 
coerced her into participating in the crimes, it follows that she would know where the 
jewelry was. Hence, Aranda's statements are not compelling of guilt, and thereby 
underscore the prejudicial effect of the court's errors. 
Even if one or the other of the court's errors is not prejudicial, their cumulative 
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effect is. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, [an appellate court] reverse[s] only if'the 
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence ... that a fair trial was 
had.1" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). In assessing a 
cumulative error claim, a reviewing court "considers] all the identified errors, as well as 
any other errors [it] assume[s] may have occurred." Id. For the reasons identified above, 
the cumulative effect of the court's errors in Aranda's case materially prejudiced her 
constitutional right to present her compulsion defense and call witnesses in her favor, and 
rendered a different trial outcome likely had the errors not occurred. Accordingly, the 
trial court's exclusion of pertinent and integral evidence under Rule 405(b), and its 
erroneous denial of a new trial or continuance for the purpose of securing a key defense 
witness, "undermines [any] confidence . . that a fair trial was had.'" Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1229 (Utah 1993) (quotation omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Aranda respectfully requests this Court to reverse her 
convictions and remand her case to the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this f & a y of June, 2001. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY J 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
DEBRA LARECE ARANDA, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991910677 FS 
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: March 17, 2000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cindyb 
Reporter: TRIPP, DOROTHY DATE. 
Prosecutor: MEISTER, VINCENT B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): FINLAYSON, DAVID V 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 1, 1957 
CAT/CIC 
Tape Number: 1:23-1:25 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
Tape Count: 12:52-1:09 
CHARGES 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2000 Guilty Plea 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2000 Guilty Plea 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2000 Guilty Plea 
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2000 Guilty Plea 
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2000 Guilty Plea 
Criminal Sentence Commitment 
JD 
Page 1 
Case No: 991910677 
Date: Mar 17, 2000 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Counts #2 and #3 to run concurrently with each other but 
consecutive to Count #1. Counts #6 and #7 to run concurrently with 
each other but consecutive to Count #1. Counts #1-3 have 
consecutive one year weapons enhancements. 
Paqe 2 
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Case No: 991910677 
Date: Mar 17, 2000 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends defendant receive substance abuse therapy at 
the prison. The Court grants credit for 3 00 days time served. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 6 month(s) 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Restitution: Amount: $14400.00 Plus Interest 
This restitution is to be paid joint and severally with the 
co-defendants. 
Dated t h i s fc day of 
J u d g e d —--"=* 
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